NORMS THAT AFFECT BENEFACTORS
The Norm of Social Responsibility
Research has been reviewed which demonstrated that people tend to help those who are dependent on them. Berkowitz and his colleagues (e.g., Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963) attributed such helping to the influence of the ‘norm of social responsibility,” which prescribes that people should help those who need help. Normative analysis suggests that people act altruistically in particular situations because it is the proper thing to do.
The notion that people act in accord with normative standards of conduct seems quite sound as far as it goes. It would seem, though, that it does not go far enough. Although normative analysts (e.g., Berkowitz [footnoteRef:4] ) have criticized the explanatory circularity of reinforcement theory, the postulation of social norms can also end in tautology. A particular response, for example, can be predicted on the basis of a norm. If it occurs, the norm is said to have had an effect. If it does not occur, the situation is said to fall outside the range of the norm. In cases where the norm is established on the basis of the behavior it is supposed to predict, it is in the same position as Skinner’s (1953) reinforcer—its existence is established by the effect it produces. The danger with normative analysis is that norms can be invented post hoc to explain almost anything. Although Berkowitz has taken steps toward the specification of eliciting situations—dependency is said to evoke the norm of social responsibility—the increase in understanding supplied by the postulation of norms can still be questioned. Because it is assumed that the norm is internalized, and that it gains its power from its ability to evoke positive and negative affect, normative analysis ultimately contains a cognitive-affective base. Understanding of the effects of norms, it would seem, awaits elucidation of their cognitive-affective representations. At any rate, the methods used to study social norms should be different from the operations used to establish their effects. And once norms are identified, focus should shift to the dynamics of their internalization and the conditions of their effect. [4: Berkowitz, L. Beyond exchange: ideals and other factors affecting helping and altruism. Unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin, 1968.]
The Norm of Giving
When Gouldner (1960) outlined the range of what he called the norm of reciprocity, he mentioned some situations in which it did not apply. The situations contained one essential characteristic: They all involved dependent recipients such as the very young, the very old, and the sick. Leeds (1963) suggested that another norm applies in situations which are beyond the range of the norm of reciprocity. She called this norm the norm of giving, and suggested that situations in which the norm of giving was influential involved “role vacuums” or “social vacuums.” Role vacuums consist of nonprescribed opportunities for altruism. The “whore with a heart” is an example. Social vacuums occur in situations where institutionalized means of action are not available. Emergency situations are cases in point. In short, the norm of giving applies in situations where help is needed, but no institutionalized means of help is available.
Leeds’ (1963) concern, like that of Gouldner (1960), was with the sociological function of norms. Little psychological research has examined the norm of giving, even though it may have been antecedent to many altruistic situations.
NORMS WHICH AFFECT THE ALTRUISMELICITING CAPACITY OF RECIPIENTS The Generation of Debt and the Norm of Reciprocity
The norm of reciprocity, as postulated by Gouldner ( 1960) , prescribes that people should help those who have helped them, and that people should not injure those who have helped them. Research pertaining to the effect of the norm of reciprocity is thought to relate to the altruism-eliciting capacity of recipients because in the prototypical experimental situation it is the generosity of the potential recipient that is varied. The fact that the generosity of the recipient is an attribute that he acquired in the role of benefactor does not alter the fact that the altruism-eliciting variable lies with the recipient. The characteristic of the recipient of importance here relates to his role as creditor. Implicit in the examination of research relevant to the norm of reciprocity is the notion of a less general level of analysis—one which identifies eliciting characteristics of recipients within the normative framework of their culture. The state variable reference of reciprocity, therefore, should be kept in mind.
It might, of course, be wondered whether the payment of debt constitutes altruism. According to the definition employed here (and, it is thought, the results of common attribution) strict reciprocity falls outside the range of altruistic behavior. Behavior which repays more than it owes, or repays favors that did not generate expectation of return, on the other hand, seems altruistic. A relatively undiscriminating examination of the research on reciprocity will be made, though, in the hope of elucidating general determinants of altruism, and, if nothing else, clarifying the distinction between reciprocity and altruism,
Research on the effects of reciprocity and altruism has examined two distinct relationships. The first is straightforward—it involves a recipient to whom something is owed. In the second situation, the owed recipient is not available for repayment, and payment is generalized to someone else.
As described by Gouldner (1960), the sociological purpose of the norm of reciprocity is to prevent exploitation of the weak by the powerful and to insure that people pay their debts. The force of the norm of reciprocity is variable according to (a) the need state of the original recipient (who becomes the benefactor), (b) the resources of the original donor (who becomes the recipient), (c) the motives imputed to the original donor, and (d) the extent to which the original donor gave of his own free will (p. 171). Gouldner ( 1960) recognized the fact that reciprocal behavior is usually expedient—the building of credit increases security. Research has demonstrated that all four factors influence reciprocity.
In the only sociological study relevant to Gouldner’s (1960) discussion, Muir and Weinstein (1962) tested the applicability of Gouldner’s (1960) model to the exchange of small favors. “Intensive interviews” showed that females from high and low SES thought that the magnitude of a debt was related to the original recipient’s need or desire (Gouldner’s point a) and to the resources of the original donor (Gouldner’s b). Females from the high SES thought debts were greater when the original favors were given freely (Gouldner’s d).
Other investigators, who used laboratory manipulations, supplied further support for Gouldner’s contentions. Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) found that undergraduate females did more work for supervisors after they received voluntary (but not compulsory) help from them, even though they did not expect to see them again (Gouldner’s d). Frisch and Greenberg (1968) found that undergraduate males who competed with a partner for two dollars were more likely to help him accumulate “proficiency credits” when they thought they had received a lot (versus a little) prior help, especially when the help was perceived as intentional (Gouldner’s d).
Pruitt (1968) offered further support for the effect of reciprocity, and for Gouldner’s point b. Male undergraduates gave more to a partner during a mixed-motive game when they had previously received a lot (versus a little) from him. They also gave more when they had received 80% of one dollar than 20% of four dollars. Strictly expedient expectations (using reciprocity as a tactic to get future favors) did not seem to be operative—subjects did not give any more to those who had large (versus small) future resources.
Studies on inappropriate favors (e.g., Brehm & Cole, 1966; Schopler & Thompson, 1968) supported Gouldner’s point c. Reciprocity was inhibited when the motives of the original benefactors were questioned.
Two studies extended the generality of the findings on reciprocity to children. Staub and Sherk (in press) found that fourth-grade children shared a crayon longer with children who had previously shared a lot (versus a little) candy with them. M. Harris (1968) found that fourth- and fifth-grade children gave to models who gave to them.
Limitations on the occurrence of reciprocal help-giving were revealed in several studies. Berkowitz and Friedman (1967), for example, found that although the norm of reciprocity seemed to influence the helping behavior of sons of middle-class entrepreneurs and workers, sons of middle-class bureaucratics were influenced by the norm of social responsibility. Floyd (1964) found that although children tended to increase the number of trinkets given to nonfriends after receiving a lot from them, they tended to decrease the number after receiving a lot from friends. Moreover, although selfish nonfriends elicited a decrease in giving, selfish friends elicited an increase. It would seem that the history of reciprocal exchanges between friends alters the set of expectations that governs the norm of reciprocity. It is also possible, of course, that friends planned to even up after the experiment.
Different Recipients—Generalized Reciprocity
Reciprocity refers to an obligatory bond between two people. In some cases, though, a third person is involved. When one person helps another person, then leaves the field, the recipient of the benefits may be more likely to help a third person. This behavior does not, as some investigators have assumed, constitute reciprocity, at least in the sense that Gouldner (1960) meant it. It is possible that the dynamics of owing are not operative at all. The norm of reciprocity prescribes that people should help those who help them—it says nothing about third parties. To remain consistent with the language of relevant investigators, the term generalized reciprocity is employed. It is meant as a descriptive, not an explanatory title.
Berkowitz and Daniels (1964) found that workers who received help from a confederate helped a highly dependent supervisor more than those who did not. The investigators interpreted these results as support for the hypothesis that the observation of helping increases the salience of the social responsibility norm, which results in further helping. It is also possible that those who were helped felt better, and the resulting positive affect mediated altruism. A further study (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966) found some differences among voluntary-, compulsory-, and refused-help conditions. Workers in the voluntary-help (same person) condition produced more for their supervisors than workers in the other two conditions. Workers in the refused-help condition indicated that they did not think that people would expect them to work hard for their supervisors. A later study (Berkowitz & Friedman, 1967) found social class differences in generalized reciprocity. Boys from the entrepreneurial middle class (but not from the bureaucratic middle class or working class) worked hard for their supervisors after they received a lot of help— whether they thought they had received it from their supervisor or a different supervisor.
A study by Test and Bryan (in press) compared the effects of modeling, dependency, and generalized reciprocity on helping behavior in female undergraduates. Experimental conditions in which a model helped a third person, and in which the subject himself was helped, resulted in more subsequent helping than no-model and negative-model conditions. The investigators concluded that generalized reciprocity had little effect beyond that of modeling. The fact that situations which involve reciprocity also involve models suggests an overlap in determinants of altruism.
Although there may be limitations in certain social classes and with long range acquaintances, the bulk of the evidence supports Gouldner’s (1960) suggestion that people tend to return favors. They are most likely to reciprocate when the original benefactor gave something he needed, when he had little, when he was sincere, and when he gave voluntarily. Moreover, several studies found that when people are unable to contact their original benefactors, they are prone to give to others.
CONCLUSIONS
Although large segments of the research on altruism failed to supply consistent findings, several trends have appeared. New developments in reinforcement theory, and the rise of concern with the process of attribution have begun to supply new ways of looking at altruism. The concept, however, is still unclear and no way has been found to measure its motivational base.
Elucidation of antecedents of altruistic behavior has not awaited the specification of the phenomenon; operational definitions have supplied a way of bypassing the issue. Research projects have appraised the correlates and determinants of altruism from several different perspectives. Most research examined the effect of temporary states of the benefactor. Both positive affective states associated with success and competence, and negative affective states associated with harming another resulted in altruistic behavior. States associated with the observation of altruistic models also mediated altruistic responses. Although the bulk of studies on modeling seem best analyzed in relation to the temporary effect of models, some studies suggested that the observation of models leads to the acquisition of behavioral dispositions and personality traits.
Research which examined the effect of temporary states of the recipient suggested that the basic altruism-eliciting attribute of recipients is their dependency. The trait as well as the state of dependency was found to elicit altruism. In most cases externally caused dependency elicited more altruism than internally caused dependency, but in cases where the status of the recipient was seen as a potential threat, internally caused dependency elicited the greater amount of altruism. Besides dependency, interpersonal attractiveness of the recipient was found to relate to altruism. Although few studies purposefully manipulated the variable, it seems likely that interpersonal attractiveness incidentally influenced the responses of benefactors in many studies. Some studies, however, indicated that attractiveness and altruism do not always go together.
Studies which examined trait variables were plagued with difficulties. Because altruism is a positive trait, it is difficult to separate it from other positive characteristics. Although trait studies generally found that altruists were well adjusted, sociable, and unassuming people, the validity of their measures of altruism was usually in doubt. Studies which used behavioral measures of altruism were less likely than studies which used rating-scale and pencil-and-paper test measures to find trait correlates.
